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Abstract. Multicast traffic, such as live audio/video streaming, is an
important application for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs), includ-
ing those used by militaries and disaster recovery teams. The open na-
ture of multicast, where any receiver can join a multicast group, and any
sender can send to a multicast group, makes it an easy vehicle for launch-
ing Denial of Service (DoS) attacks in resource-constrained MANETs.
In this paper, we extend our previously introduced DIPLOMA archi-
tecture to secure multicast traffic. DIPLOMA is a deny-by-default dis-
tributed policy enforcement architecture that can protect the end-host
services and network bandwidth. DIPLOMA uses capabilities to provide
a unified solution for sender and receiver access control to the multicast
groups, as well as to limit the bandwidth usage of the multicast group.
We have extended common multicast protocols, including ODMRP and
PIM-SM, to incorporate DIPLOMA. We have implemented multicast
DIPLOMA in Linux, without requiring any changes to existing appli-
cations and the routing substrate. We conducted an experimental eval-
uation of the system in the Orbit MANET testbed. The results show
that the architecture incurs limited overhead in throughput, packet loss,
and packet inter-arrival times. We also show that the system protects
network bandwidth and the end-hosts in the presence of attackers.
1 Introduction
Multicast enables delivery of information from one source to many destinations
efficiently, without the source to unicasting to individual destinations. In multi-
cast, nodes send packets over a link only once. They create copies of the packet,
and send to multiple links when the packets need to go on multiple links to reach
destinations. Multicasting is used for content distribution applications, like audio
and video streaming.
Mobile ad-hoc networks are increasingly used in tactical military and civil
rapid-deployment networks, including emergency rescue operations and disaster
relief network, due to their flexibility in deployment. Audio and video content
distribution is an important application on these networks, making support for
multicast an absolute necessity. Multicast also improves the efficiency of wireless
links in MANETs, due to the broadcast nature of the medium.
The set of nodes receiving the messages that are addressed to a common
multicast address form amulticast group. Traditionally, there are three properties
of multicast group [3]:
1. All the members receive all the packets send to the multicast group.
2. Any node can join the multicast group.
3. Any node can send packet to the multicast group.
All these properties have security implications, and there are solutions pro-
posed for them in the context of the (wired) Internet. Most of these solutions
differentiate the routers from the receiver nodes (or multicast group members),
as it is the case in wired networks. The routers are secure and well behaved.
These solutions are not suitable for MANETs, since the nodes play the dual
role of receivers (and senders) of the traffic and routers for forwarding other
node’s traffic. Furthermore, exploiting these properties increase the resource us-
age, making multicast an easy tool for launching denial of service attacks on re-
source constrained MANETs. In this paper, we propose extensions to DIPLOMA
architecture, which stands for DIstributed PoLicy enfOrceMent Architecture,
to provide multicast security in MANETs.
DIPLOMA is a deny-by-default architecture [2] that enforces trust relation-
ships and traffic accountability between mobile nodes through a distributed pol-
icy enforcement scheme for MANETs. In that architecture, capabilities propa-
gate both access control rules and traffic-shaping parameters that should govern
a node’s traffic. In the deny-by-default, model nodes can only access the services
and hosts they are authorized for by the capabilities given to them. The enforce-
ment of the capability is done in a distributed manner by all the nodes in the
path from the source to the destination. Compromised or malicious nodes cannot
exceed their authority and expose the whole network to an adversary. Upon de-
tection, we can prevent a compromised node from further attacking the network
simply by revoking its capabilities. Moreover, that architecture helps mitigate
the impact of denial of service (DoS) attacks because excess or unauthorized
packets are dropped closer to the attack source. Thus, we avoid unnecessary
data processing and forwarding at the target node and the network itself.
Multicast security protocols for wired networks have treated receiver access
control and sender access control as two separate problems [10]. Receiver access
control is provided using a group policy management system and a group member
authorization system [3]. Sender access control can be provided using source
specific multicast (SSM), in which only single source can transmit to a multicast
group. A MANET node’s IP address can change when moving between networks,
and requires explicit sender access control. Furthermore, because of the broadcast
nature of the medium, it is much easier to do IP address spoofing in MANETs.
In this paper, we provide a unified solution for both receiver access con-
trol and sender access control for MANETs by extending DIPLOMA to secure
multicast traffic. We define capabilities for use with multicast traffic. There are
separate capabilities defined for sending and receiving multicast traffic. A node
will not be able to send, or join the multicast group without possessing these
capabilities. These capabilities also provide bandwidth constraints for the mul-
ticast sessions, preventing resource hogging by the multicast group members.
The nodes in MANET enforce the access control and bandwidth constraints of
the capability in a distributed manner. We propose modifications to multicast
protocols to incorporate capabilities and show the modifications for two popular
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multicast routing protocols On Demand Multicast Routing Protocol (ODMRP)
and Protocol Independent Multicasting Spare Mode (PIM-SM).
We implement the multicast DIPLOMA on Linux. Our implementation does
not require any changes to existing multicast applications or the PIM-SM mul-
ticast daemon. However, the applications see the benefit in terms of receiving
only the authorized traffic, and being able to send the allocated bandwidth even
in the presence of rogue nodes that are trying to conduct a DoS attack.
We implement our system in the Orbit Lab testbed. We conduct extensive
experiments to evaluate the performance and effectiveness of our system. We
show that multicast DIPLOMA incurs minimal overhead in terms of throughput,
packet loss and inter-arrival times. We also study the effect on video streaming
in our system. Finally, we show that multicast DIPLOMA is effective against
attackers. Note that we do not address confidentiality of the multicast messages.
Group key encryption is used to encrypt the multicast traffic using symmetric
keys. Group key management is used for efficient re-keying for dynamic group
memberships [3].
We describe the DIPLOMA architecture in Section 2, the threat model in
Section 3, its extension to multicast in Section 4, and the implementation in
Section 5. We describe our experimental methodology and results in Section 6.
Section 7 discusses related work.
2 System Architecture
2.1 DIPLOMA Overview
In our architecture, one or more pre-defined nodes act as a group controller (GC),
which is trusted by all the group nodes. A GC has authority to assign resources
to the nodes in MANET. This resource allocation is represented as a credential
(capability) called policy token, and it can be used to express the services and
the bandwidth a node is allowed to access. They are cryptographically signed
by the GC, which can be verified any node in the MANET.
When a node (initiator) requests a service from another MANET node (re-
sponder) using the policy token assigned to the initiator, the responder can
provide a capability back to the initiator. This is called a network capability,
and it is generated based on the resource policy assigned to the responder and
its dynamic conditions (e.g., level of utilization).
Figure 1 gives a brief overview of DIPLOMA. All nodes in the path between
an initiator to a responder (i.e., nodes relaying the packets) enforce and abide by
the resource allocation encoded by the GC in the policy token and the responder
in the network capability. The enforcement involves both access control and
bandwidth allocation. A responder accepts packets (except for the first) from
an initiator only if the initiator is authorized to send, in the form of a valid
network capability. It accepts the first packet only if the initiator’s policy token
is included. An intermediate node will forward the packets from a node only if
they have an associated policy token or network capability, and if they do not
violate the conditions contained therein. Possession of a network capability does
not imply resource reservation; they are the maximum limits a node can use.
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Fig. 1. System overview
Available resources are allocated by the intermediate nodes in a fair manner, in
proportion to the allocations defined in the policy token and network capability.
The capability need not be contained in all packets. The first packet car-
ries the capability, along with a transaction identifier (TXI) and a public key.
Subsequent packets contain only the TXI and a packet signature based on that
public key. Intermediate nodes cache policy tokens and network capabilities in
a capability database, treating them as soft state. A capability database entry
contains the source and the destination addresses, TXI, the capability, public
key for the packet signature and packet statistics. Capability retransmissions
update the soft state of intermediate nodes when the route changes due to node
mobility. The soft state after a route change is also updated using an on-demand
query for the capability database entry from the upstream nodes.
2.2 Multicast Capability
DIPLOMA use multicast capabilities for access control and bandwidth limita-
tions. They have same syntactic structure as unicast capabilities [2].
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The above represents a policy token assigned by node captain.nj.army.mil to
unit01. This is a multicast capability, since the destination address is a multicast
address. Unit01 can multicast video traffic up to 512 kbps to the group 225.1.1.8.
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There are two types of multicast capabilities: Multicast Send Capability
(MSC) and Multicast Receive Capability (MRC). The flags in the capa-
bility indicate the type of the multicast capability. The nodes possessing a MSC
can send the traffic to the multicast group, limited by the bandwidth allocation
on the capability. They can also join the multicast group and receive the traffic
from the group. The nodes possessing a MRC can join the multicast group only
to receive data; They do not have authority to send data to the group.
The group controllers allocate MSCs, and hence they are of type policy to-
kens. MRCs can be either a policy token or a network capability. The group
controller or a sender that has authority in the form of a policy allocates them.
3 Threat Model
Our goal is to protect network resources and the multicast traffic from denial
of service attacks, and to enforce access control rules in the absence of a fixed
topology. Thus, we want a receiver node to be able to access only the multicast
services it is entitled to, and to limit the amount of traffic that can be sent to any
multicast group by the authorized senders. To preserve bandwidth and power,
we need to filter any unauthorized traffic early on.
We assume MANET environments where an adversary may be an existing
node that has been compromised (insider) or a malicious external node that
might want to participate in the MANET. In addition, there may be multiple
cooperating adversaries; and compromised nodes may not be detected as such
immediately, or ever (depending on their actions).
The resources needed to access a service are allocated by the group con-
troller(s) (GCs) of the MANET. Group controllers are nodes responsible for
maintaining the group membership for a set of MANET nodes, and a priori
authorize communications within the group. This means that GCs do not par-
ticipate in the actual communications, nor do they need to be consulted by nodes
in real time; in fact, if they distribute the appropriate policies ahead of time,
they need not even be members of the MANET. In most cases, the GC may
be reachable through a high-energy-consumption, high-latency, low-bandwidth
long-range link (e.g., a satellite connection); interactions in such an environment
should be kept to a minimum, and only for exceptional circumstances (e.g., for
revoking access for compromised nodes).
Without compromising a GC, an external node can participate in a MANET
only by stealing the authorization credentials that are bound to the identity of a
legitimate node. Because we envision GCs as being primarily offline or, at best,
intermittently reachable (with respect to the MANET), we are not addressing
the issue of compromised controllers in this paper.
If a node is compromised, an adversary can only access the services and
bandwidth that node is authorized to access. If other MANET nodes are adhering
to our architecture, a compromised node does not have the ability to disrupt or
interfere with end-to-end service connectivity and other nodes beyond its local
radio communication radius. The nodes providing services will receive only the
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traffic that the compromised node is authorized to transmit, unless the adversary
is in the local communication radius.
4 DIPLOMA for Multicast Protocols
Unlike the unicast implementation of DIPLOMA, multicast implementation de-
pends on the underlying multicast protocol used. This is because a multicast
forwarding node does not know about the receiver nodes to enforce the multi-
cast receive capability, without interfacing with the multicast routing protocol.
Hence, our implementation influence the protocol by snooping and filtering the
packets, even though it does not directly modify the multicast protocol process-
ing modules. DIPLOMA may also modify the packet immediately before the
packet is sent to the physical interface and immediately after it is received on
the interface.
There are two types of multicast routing protocols. The first type is flooding
based protocols, where the multicast tree is created for the entire topology based
on flooding. Later, part of the tree that does not have any receivers is pruned by
explicit prune or status discovery messages. An example of this type of protocol
is Protocol Independent Multicasting in Dense Mode (PIM-DM). This type of
protocol is useful when most of the nodes in the network are members of the
group. The second type, which is more predominant, creates a tree (or mesh)
based on the membership. A branch in the tree is created only if there a node
in that branch that wants to receive the multicast traffic from the group. There
is no wasted data bandwidth in this protocol, even though efficiency of the
bandwidth usage depends on the type of the tree construction. Examples of
this type of protocol include Protocol Independent Multicasting in Sparse Mode
(PIM-SM), MAODV, ODMRP etc. In this paper, we focus on implementing the
DIPLOMA on this type of protocols.
The receivers are required to send explicit messages to join the multicast
tree. This message may traverse multiple intermediate nodes to reach the tree
or the node in charge of constructing the tree. Depending on the protocol, the
intermediate node may directly forward this message, or send a different message
to the same effect to the upstream node. We call these messages collectively as
Join-Tree messages. In PIM-SM protocol, Join-Tree messages constitute IGMP
membership report message, as well as Join/Prune message. In ODMRP proto-
col, it is the Join Reply message serving this role. In DIPLOMA, we make use
of Join-Tree messages to send the MRCs. The nodes drop the Join-Tree mes-
sages that do not contain the valid MRCs. When there are multiple downstream
receivers, the forwarding node needs to send only one of the MRCs upstream.
Join-Tree messages forwarded by a node may contain the MRC of its down-
stream node, instead of its own. This happens when the node is just a forwarding
node but not a member of the multicast group. To avoid MRC reuse by rogue for-
warding nodes for future multicast sessions, the receivers add an expiration time
to the MRC in Join-Tree messages. Receivers sign the (capability, timestamp)
tuple with their public key. We call that message time stamped MRC.
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Many multicast protocols have explicit messages initiated by the sender to
form the tree. For example, ODMRP has Join Query message send by the sender
to initiate the tree creation. Not all protocols have this mechanism. For example,
PIM-SM does not require the sender to join the multicast group for sending
multicast packets. Hence, we do not rely on any of the protocol messages to
send the MSC. Instead, we send the MSC when data traffic starts flowing, like
in the unicast case. This has an advantage of treating multicast and unicast
data the same way, independent of the underlying protocol. To provide added
security, we also send the MSC on the protocols that require explicit tree create
message from the sender.
An intermediate node forwards a multicast data packet only if both of the
following conditions are satisfied:
1. The data packet has an associated MSC from the sender in the node’s capa-
bility database, and the data packet is conformant to the capability in the
form of valid packet signature and the bandwidth constraints.
2. The node has a valid multicast receive capability from one of the receivers
in the downstream path. The intermediate node forwards the packet on an
interface only if it has a time stamped MRC for a receiver that is reachable
on that interface.
A receiving node may leave the multicast tree in two ways depending on
the multicast protocol. Some protocols support explicit leave messages. Since
it may not be always possible to send a leave message (e.g., the receiver node
crashed), the protocols also has periodic membership query. When the receiver
node receives a query, it sends some form of a Tree-Join message. In a DIPLOMA
enabled systems, the receive node also sends a time stamped MRC in those
messages. Then the intermediate (forwarding) node forwards one of the time
stamped MRC to the upstream node in its Tree-Join message. When a node
does not receive any time stamped MRCs from the downstream nodes on an
interface, that interface is pruned from the multicast tree (or mesh).
4.1 Security Analysis
We now discuss how our architecture relates to the threat model described in
Section 3.
Since the capabilities are signed by a GC and are verifiable by all nodes,
adversaries cannot generate their own valid capabilities. Adversaries can create
valid capabilities only if the GC is compromised. Since the individual packets
are signed, an adversary cannot use a transaction id that does not belong to it
to transmit packets.
A compromised or malicious node that does not enforce the capability pro-
tocol can only have impact within its communication radius. Packets generated
without the capability or with a snooped transaction id by a malicious node will
be dropped by the neighboring nodes due to invalid signatures. A compromised
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Fig. 2. ODMRP Protocol
use more bandwidth than is allocated to them will be rejected. A malicious node
frequently doing this can be detected and isolated.
A multicast receiver can only join the multicast groups for which it posses a
MRC. Similarly, a multicast sender can send traffic only to the groups for which
it posses a MSC. Furthermore, this send traffic is limited by the bandwidth
constraints of the MSC. Only the links which are part of the multicast tree
or mesh actually carry the multicast traffic. Since the packets are signed, any
injection of packets into a data stream is easily detectable by the nodes in the
path.
4.2 DIPLOMA on ODMRP
Figure 2 gives a high level overview of the On Demand Multicast Routing Pro-
tocol (ODMRP) [13] protocol. There is a sender node S that wants to multicast
data into a group. Three receiver nodes R1, R2 and R3 are part of the multicast
group. Two nodes F1 and F2 are in the path from the node S to the receivers.
We call those nodes as intermediate nodes. When the node S has data to multi-
cast, it broadcasts a Join Query message to the neighboring nodes to discover a
multicast tree. This message is received by the intermediate nodes F1 and F2,
which in turn broadcasts to their neighbors. The nodes R1 and R2 receives the
Join Query from the node F1, and the node R3 receives the Join Query from
the node F2. The receiver nodes send a Join Reply message back to the nodes
from which it received the Join Query message (i.e. the upstream nodes F1 and
F2). Once the nodes F1 and F2 receive the Join Reply messages they become
part of the forwarding group and forwards the Join Reply messages to node S.
In DIPLOMA systems that are running over ODMRP protocol, Join Query
messages are modified to contain the MSC of the sender, and the transaction id
and the key that will be used by the sender for subsequent communication. The
intermediate nodes store this capability information temporarily and forward the
Join Query message to its neighbors. On receiving this Join Query, a receiver
node in the multicast group responds with a Join Reply message. This Join
Reply message is modified to contain the receiver’s time stamped MRC that
authorizes the node to be part of the multicast group. On receiving a Join Reply,
the intermediate node becomes part of the Forwarding Group. The intermediate
node installs the saved MSC in its capability database. The intermediate node
then forwards the Join Reply to its upstream node (i.e. towards the sender). It is
possible for the intermediate node to receive Join Replies from multiple receivers
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with different MRCs. The intermediate node needs to forward only one of them
to its upstream node. Then the forwarding node starts forwarding the multicast
data traffic to the downstream nodes. Similar to the unicast case, the forwarding
nodes enforce the capability for all the multicast packets.
Whenever the time stamped MRCs expire, a forwarding node stops forward-
ing any multicast packet received by the node. ODMRP is a stateless protocol
that does not have any multicast leave or prune messages. Instead, the tree is
valid only for certain duration. The tree is completely dissolved when that timer
expires. Furthermore, the receiver nodes can respond with Join-Reply messages
only when it receives Join-Request message from a sender. There is no mecha-
nism for a new receiver to add itself to an existing multicast tree. The sender
maintains the multicast tree, and adds new receivers by periodically sending the
Join-Query message. The DIPLOMA keeps the time stamped MRC up to date
through this periodic tree maintenance protocol. Whenever a receiver gets a new
Join-Query message, it creates a new time stamped MRC to respond back in the
Join-Reply. To maintain continuous multicast data session, it is important for
the period in which a new Join-Query is generated to be less than the validity
duration of the time stamped MRC.
4.3 DIPLOMA on PIM-SM
Protocol Independent Multicast - Sparse Mode (PIM-SM) is a popular multicast
routing protocol that is independent of the underlying unicast protocol. This
protocol works in conjunction with the Internet Group Membership Protocol
(IGMP). The protocol explicitly creates a tree from the sender to the receivers.
In PIM-SM, one of the router is designated as a Rendezvous Point (RP)
for a multicast group. All the other routers need to join the group through RP.
Whenever a node wants to join a multicast group, it conveys the message through
an IGMP membership report message. A designated router (DR) for the node
sends periodic PIM it Join/Prune messages towards the RP for the multicast
group. Each router along the path to RP updates the packet forwarding state
(routing entries) and sends the Join/Prune message towards the RP.
Whenever a node wants to send the traffic to the multicast group, its DR
encapsulates the data in PIM Register messages and unicasts it to the RP. The
RP decapsulates the message and sends the data towards the receivers in the
multicast tree. If the data-rate from the sender is high, then the RP sends a
source specific Join/Prune message towards the sender. This extends the tree
to the sender, and the sender can directly send multicast messages to the tree
without encapsulating the messages. If the data rate warrants it, any DR can
join source specific shortest path tree by sending a Join/Prune message towards
the sender, and prune the shared tree towards the RP.
We can enable DIPLOMA in multicast systems running PIM-SM by includ-
ing the multicast capabilities in the IGMP and PIM messages. Whenever a
receiver sends an IGMP membership report message, its timestamped MRC is
included. DIPLOMA systems reject any membership report without the capa-
bility. A DR includes one of the time stamped capabilities of the downstream
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Fig. 3. DIPLOMA Implementation
nodes in the Join/Prune messages it sends towards the RP or the source node.
When a router receives a prune message, the corresponding time stamped MRC
is removed from its tables. The node stops forwarding the packets, when it does
not have any valid time stamped MRC from the downstream receivers.
The multicast packets are sent similar to unicast case. Before sending the
packet, the sender multicasts it’s MSC in a capability request packet with the
capability, transaction identifier and the key for the packet signatures. This
packet goes to the RP as a regular multicast packet or a Register packet; the
RP in turn sends the packet to the multicast group (after decapsulation for the
Register packets). All the nodes in the multicast tree add the capability to their
capability database. If it is a register packet, then the nodes in the path between
the sender and the RP will also extract the capability, transaction id and the key
for the signature from the capability request, and install in their database. Any
subsequent data packet multicast by the sender contains the transaction id and
the packet signature. The signature is verified and the bandwidth is enforced by
all the nodes in the multicast tree, and by the nodes between the sender and the
RP in the case of the Register packets.
If a receiver node joins the multicast tree after the transmission of the initial
capability request packet by the sender, then it will not be able to validate the
multicast data packets. DIPLOMA solves this by two means: Firstly, the sender
periodically multicasts the capability request packet. The new receiver node
can start accepting the data packets after the periodic multicast. Secondly, the
receiver sends a request for the capability towards the sender using a DIPLOMA
control (or error) packet. On receiving this request, either an intermediate node
or the sender responds with the capability and the public key for the signature.
5 Linux Implementation
We now describe the implementation of Multicast DIPLOMA on Debian Linux
system running kernel 2.6.30. For multicast routing, we use pimd, a PIM-SM
package that comes with the Debian distribution. Since PIM-SM requires a sep-
arate unicast routing, we use University of Uppsala’s AODV implementation
called AODV-UU. Our implementation does not require any changes to the ap-
plication program, routing module or PIM-SM daemon.
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The multicast DIPLOMA is implemented as a user level process, called
DIPLOMA engine that interfaces with rest of the Linux packet processing sub-
system using netfilter framework. We use netfilter queue to receive, modify, and
filter packets in the DIPLOMA engine.
Figure 3 shows how the DIPLOMA engine interfaces with netfilter subsys-
tem. A brief description of Netfilter framework and how the DIPLOMA uses
it for handling the unicast traffic can be found in [1]. The dotted lines are the
hooks used only for the multicast traffic. The solid lines show the hook for both
unicast and the multicast traffic. The reason for requiring additional hooks for
the multicast traffic is due to the implementation of PIM-SM in Linux. It uses
raw sockets to send and receive traffic; these packets do not go through INPUT
and OUTPUT hooks, but traverse PREROUTING and POSTROUTING hooks.
Next, we describe the packet flow for control (i.e., IGMP and PIM packets)
and multicast data packets.
5.1 Membership Messages
When the system sends a membership message, in the form of an ICMP message
or a PIM Join/Prune message, the DIPLOMA engine receives on the packet on
OUTPUT hook. It checks for a valid MRC for the message in its database. The
valid capability may be either its own capability, or a capability it received from
a downstream node. It adds the capability in the packet and sends an ACCEPT
verdict on the hook.
When the system receives a membership message on the PREROUTING
hook, it validates the packet. A valid packet needs to contain a valid MRC. The
node saves the MRC in its tables for subsequent request to the upstream node.
The capability is removed from the packet and an accept verdict is given. The
PIM-SM daemon receives this packet over the RAW socket. The engine drops
any membership message without a valid capability.
5.2 Capability establishment
When a sender needs to multicast data, it creates a transaction identifier for use
with subsequent packets to identify the session. It also creates an RSA key for
signing the data packets of that session. The sender sends the transaction id,
public key and the MSC authorizing the sender to send the multicast packet as
a DIPLOMA control message. The DIPLOMA engine sends this message when
it first sees a packet from the sender for a multicast group. The application
program sending the multicast data need not be aware of this step.
When a multicast member node or a forwarding node receives this message,
it validates the capability and stores the transaction id, the public key and the
MSC in its capability database. These nodes validate the subsequent data packets
coming from the sender against the capability and verify the packet signatures.
For updating the new receivers or new intermediate node after a route change,
the sender multicasts the capability establishment packet periodically. A receiver
node can also request the sender on a unicast message to send the capability
establishment packet, when it does not have that information due to late joining
or a route change.
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5.3 Multicast Data Packets
All the multicast data packets need to contain an associated capability. The
DIPLOMA engine at the sender modifies the outgoing packets in the OUTPUT
hook by including a capability header, which contains the transaction identifier
and the packet signature. The packets sent to a multicast group are treated
together as a block for the signature computation [1]. A packet block contains
maximum of block size (P) packets that are sent with in the interval block time-
out (T). The packet signatures for a block consist of RSA signature for the first
packet and SHA-1 hashes for the remaining packets. The RSA signature is verifi-
able with the key sent in the capability establishment phase. The SHA-1 hashes
are integrity protected by including them in the first packet.
The engine at the intermediate node receives the multicast packet on FOR-
WARD hook. The engine validates the packet against the capability using the
transaction identifier. The validation including checking if there is a valid MSC
in its database associated with the transaction identifier, if the packet has valid
signature, and if the packet conforms to the bandwidth constraints of the ca-
pability. If the packet is valid, then the engine gives an ACCEPT verdict for
forwarding the packet.
If the packet is destined to the node as a receiver on the multicast group,
DIPLOMA receives the packet on the INPUT hook. The engine validates the
packet as above, removes the capability header from the packet and gives an
ACCEPT verdict, causing the kernel to deliver the packet to the application.
6 Experimental evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of multicast DIPLOMA. First, we
compare the throughput, packet loss and inter arrival times of the systems with
and without multicast DIPLOMA using periodic traffic. We also study these
parameters using real video streaming traces. Finally, we study the effectiveness
of DIPLOMA in containing the attacker nodes.
6.1 Testbed
We implemented the multicast DIPLOMA engine as described in Section 5 in
Linux systems running Debian Linux with kernel 2.6.30. We use AODV-UU for
routing unicast traffic, modified to handle multiple interfaces. For multicast rout-
ing, we use PIM-SM implementation called pimd that is available with Debian
Linux distribution. We run the resulting system on multiple nodes in the Orbit
lab1 wireless testbed. Orbit is an indoor wireless testbed consisting of 400 nodes
arranged as a 20x20 grid on a physical area of (20m x 20m). Each node con-
tains 1-GHz VIA C3 processor, 512 MB RAM, a 20 GB hard disk, two wireless
mini-PCI 802.11 a/b/g interfaces, and two 100BaseT Ethernet ports.
Since the nodes are within the communication range of each other in Orbit
testbed, we use channel hoping to create multi-hop topologies. The traditional

















































Fig. 4. Tree topology Fig. 5. Throughput for line topology
suitable for studying the security system like DIPLOMA, since an attacker node
can cause damage in its communication radius.
Since the DIPLOMA engine is a user-level process, all packets are queued for
user-level processing before transmission. To make a fair comparison, we also do
a similar queuing of the packet to a user level process on systems not running the
DIPLOMA (called original). The user level program gives an ACCEPT verdict
on all the packets, without any processing.
For measuring the performance of the DIPLOMA, we use two topologies: a
line topology and a tree topology. In line topology nodes are allocated channels
in such a way that each node can directly communicate only with its neighbors
on either side (except for the first and last, which has only one neighbor). In this
topology, the first node is the sender of the multicast. All the remaining nodes
subscribe to the multicast group. The tree topology is shown on figure 4. The
links are labeled with the channel with which the nodes communicate. Here the
sender is the node 0 (root), and the multicast receivers are nodes 3,4,5,6 (leaf
nodes). In the figure, the solid lines show the multicast tree and the dashed lines
shows the links that are not participating in the multicast.
We use the multi-generator tool mgen [14] from Naval Research Laboratory
to send and receive traffic in our experiments. Each data points in this section
represent an average of running six experiments, each experiments sending traffic
for 30 seconds each.
6.2 Line Topology
In this set of experiments, we study the performance of DIPLOMA and the
original schemes for the line topology. The sender sends periodic traffic of size
1024 bytes at the rate of 100, 300 and 500 packets per second. This corresponds
to the rates of 819.2 Kbps, 2.4576 Mbps and 4.096 Mbps respectively.
Figure 5 shows the throughput received by the nodes at different hop lengths
for different transmission rates. For the rate of 100 and 300 pkts/sec, both the
DIPLOMA and the original schemes receive bandwidth close to the send band-
width for all the hops. The bandwidth for the DIPLOMA is minimally (0.7%
and 3.7% respectively) lower than the original. For the rate of 500 pkts/sec,
the received bandwidth reduces as the hop count increases. This is because the























































Fig. 6. Packet loss for line topology








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 8. Throughput for tree topology Fig. 9. Packet loss for tree topology
for the DIPLOMA is 6.6% lower than the original. This is due to larger headers
and processing required for the DIPLOMA.
Figure 6 shows the packet loss for the same experiment. The packet losses are
less than 1% for both the schemes for the rate of 100 & 300 pkts/sec. The packet
losses are higher for the rate of 500 kbps, which explains the lower throughput
as the hops count increases. The packet loss is about 5% more for DIPLOMA,
due to larger headers, which require more bandwidth.
Figure 7 shows the packet inter arrival times for the same experiments. For
the rates 100 and 300 pkts/sec, the inter arrival is close to the inverse of their
send rate. The inter arrival for diploma is slightly higher than the original, due to
larger processing required. For the 500 pkts/sec rate, inter-arrival time increases
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Fig. 11. Streaming video throughput for
line topology
Fig. 12. Streaming video packet inter ar-












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 13. Streaming video throughput for
the tree topology
Fig. 14. Streaming video packet inter ar-
rival times for the tree topology
6.3 Tree topology
We study the throughput, packet loss and inter arrival times for the tree topology
given in Figure 4. Here the root node 0 is the sender and the leaf nodes 3,4,5,6
are the receivers.
Figure 8 shows the throughput at the nodes for both the schemes. Though
the nodes are at same distance from the root, they receive different bandwidths.
This may be because of the channel conditions and the packet scheduling. For
some nodes, the DIPLOMA receives higher bandwidth than the original. The
sum of the bandwidth received by all the four receivers is slightly higher for the
original scheme compared to the DIPLOMA scheme. This total bandwidth is
2.1%, 2.1% and 3.6% higher respectively for the rates 100, 300 and 500 pkts/sec
for original compared to DIPLOMA.
Figure 8 shows the packet loss at the nodes for both the schemes. Unlike the
line topology, there was some packet losses (6% to 9%) for the rates of 100 and
300 pkts/sec for both the schemes on some of the nodes. This may also be due
to channel conditions.
Figure 10 shows the packet inter arrival times for both the schemes. Here
also for some receivers, the inter arrival times were shorter for the DIPLOMA.
However, on average, the inter arrival times for the DIPLOMA was slightly





































































































































































Node4 Node5 Node6 Attacker
300 pkt/s
100 pkt/s
Fig. 15. Attack topology
Fig. 16. Throughput in presence of uni-
cast attacker
6.4 Streaming video
In this set of experiments, we study the performance of streaming video. The ex-
periments were conducted by creating a trace of streaming video using evalvid [12],
and sending that packets based on that trace using mgen.
Figures 11 and 12 shows the throughput and the inter arrival times for the
streaming video for the line topology. The results show that both the DIPLOMA
and the original schemes receive the full bandwidth the video, and the packets
are received at constant inter-arrival times.
Figures 13 and 14 shows the results for the tree topology. There was a small
loss in two of the nodes for both the schemes. This behavior is similar to the
results for the periodic traffic.
6.5 Attacker resiliency
Now we study the effectiveness of multicast DIPLOMA in containing attackers.
We use the topology given in figure 15. The solid lines show the multicast tree
and the dashed lines show the unicast path. The labels on the links show the
channels. In the experiments below, the nodes 0 and 1 are the senders. These
nodes have only its neighboring nodes 2 and 3 respectively in it communication
radius. Hence only nodes 2 or 3 cannot be protected by DIPLOMA, when these
nodes misbehaves at Physical or MAC layer.
We study how DIPLOMA can protect multicast sessions when there is a DoS
attacker sending high-rate traffic. Node 1 (attacker) sends periodic traffic of size
1024 bytes at the rate of 1000 packets per second (i.e., rate of 8.19 Mbps) to
node 7. The allocated bandwidth for the attacker was 1 Mbps. At the same time,
node 0 multicasts to receivers nodes 4, 5 and 6 a periodic traffic of size 1024 at
rates 100 pkts/s (i.e., 819.2 Kbps) or 300 pkts/s (i.e., 2.45 Mbps).
Figure 16 shows the throughput at the three multicast receivers and the
unicast receiver (attack traffic). In DIPLOMA, the attacker is able to achieve a
bandwidth of 844 Kbps, which is the allocated bandwidth (minus the overhead).
The multicast receivers receive close to their send bandwidth. The multicast
receivers receive on average 749 Kbps and 1.80 Mbps respectively for 100 and
300 pkt/s traffic. For the original scheme, the attacker is taking up most of the
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bandwidth, at 8.04 Mbps. The multicast traffic receives only a fraction of its
send bandwidth. The multicast receivers receive on average only 517 kbps and
788 kbps respectively for 100 pkt/s and 300 pkt/s traffic.
7 Related Work
The concept of capabilities was used in operating system for securing resources
[17]. Follow-on work investigated the controlled exposure of resources at the net-
work layer using the concept of “visas” for packets [7], which is similar to network
capabilities. More recently, network capabilities were proposed to prevent DoS
in wired networks [4]. We extend the concept to MANET and use it for both
access control rules and traffic shaping parameters.
A survey of security issues and solutions for multicast in wired networks
is presented in [3]. They classify the issues and solution based on the three
properties described in Section 1. The solutions are specific to wired networks
and not directly applicable to MANETs, which have no specialized router nodes.
A number of solutions have been proposed for multicast receiver access con-
trol [10, 9, 5]. These solutions have trusted routers or query centralized servers,
thus neither is suitable for MANETs. These protocols do not also have limita-
tions on the amount of service accessed. DIPLOMA provides a unified solution
to both receiver and sender access control, and supports bandwidth constraints.
There are a number of multicast routing protocols proposed for MANETs.
A survey of these protocols is present in [6]. There has been work dealing with
security issues of these protocols. A discussion of possible attacks on MAODV
(Multicast-extended AODV) routing can be found in [15]. The authors also pro-
pose an authentication framework to protect an MAODV network against these
attacks. Tactical MAODV [16] extends MAODV through the integration of the
security services necessary for the tactical deployment of MANETs, such as for-
ward and backward secrecy and data confidentiality. In [8] authors extend their
multicast MANET protocol MMARP with digital signatures using a public key
scheme. They use Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA) to keep at-
tackers from impersonating other nodes. [11] introduces a protocol for secure
communication in multicast groups with a pair of multicast trees for each mul-
ticast group; one for security information and the other for data traffic.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
We presented multicast DIPLOMA, an architecture for securing multicast traffic
in MANETs. DIPLOMA is a deny-by-default, distributed policy enforcement
architecture based on network capabilities. It prevents unauthorized senders from
sending packets to a multicast group, and unauthorized receivers from joining the
multicast group, protecting the end-host resources and the network bandwidth.
We showed that popular multicast protocols such as ODMRP and PIM-SM can
be modified to incorporate DIPLOMA. We implemented the DIPLOMA in Linux
running PIM-SM without any changes to applications and routing. We evaluated
the system on the Orbit MANET testbed. We showed that the impact of the
17
scheme is minimal on throughput, packet loss, and packet inter-arrival times.
We also showed that DIPLOMA allocates resources in a fair manner even in the
presence of attackers, protecting legitimate traffic.
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